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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Bally's concurs with Francia's assessment that this Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j) 1953,
as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this brief are:
1.

May Francia raise issues before this Court he failed to

raise before the trial court?
2.

Is Francia's failure to respond to a Rule 56, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion as required by Rule 56(e) fatal
to his opposition of the motion and to his appeal?
3.

Are the exculpatory provisions of the agreement

sufficiently specific to be enforced?
4.

Is the agreement void as against public policy?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment
are appropriately granted only as a matter of law, appellate
courts accord no deference to the trial court's determinations
and review the issues under a correctness standard.
v.

Koroulis,

K & T,

Inc.

888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994).

Because Francia suggested to the trial court its
interpretation of the contract should turn on what he intended,
this Court should review aspects of this appeal pertaining to
interpretation of the contract under the clearly-erroneous
C \IN\BRIEF
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Trail

standard.
Forestry,

Aft. Coal

Co. v.

Utah Div.

Of State

Lands

&

884 P.2d 1265 (Utah App. 1994).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The law relevant to the disposition of this appeal is set
forth within the text of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from and order granting Bally's Motion to
Dismiss.
Francia filed suit claiming he was injured when employees of
Bally's failed to properly assist him as he participated in a
weight lifting contest at Bally's spa.

Record at 1.

Bally's

moved to dismiss Francia's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and attached the Affidavit of an
employee of Bally's with a copy of Francia's Membership
Application.

Record at 23.

Francia filed his memorandum in opposition but no affidavit
or other supporting documents were filed with Francia's
memorandum.

The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on the

grounds that the actions, or inaction, of which Francia
complained were specifically waived and released by the
Membership Agreement.

Record at 70.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Francia raises the law stated in Tunkl
of

Calif.,

C:\IN\BRIEF

v. Regents

of

Univ.

60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963) for
2

the first time on appeal.

He also specifically argues the

Membership Agreement is a contract of adhesion for the first time
on appeal.

Where these issues were not raised before the trial

court, they may not be raised on appeal.
Bally's motion was supported by an affidavit.

Francia

responded to the motion without any supporting affidavit or other
documentation.

Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

requires such supplementation.

Francia's failure to meet the

requirements of Rule 56 (e) was fatal to his response before the
trial court and fatal to his appeal.
Utah law allows exculpatory contracts if they are
appropriately drawn to specify the covered behavior.

By the

Membership Agreement, Francia waived his right to sue for "our
negligent instruction or supervision" which negligence for the
factual basis for his claims as pled in his Complaint.
Even if this court were to adopt the analysis of Tunkl
Regents

of

Univ.

of

Calif.,

v.

supra, Bally's health spa is not a

public servant.
ARGUMENT
I
FRANCIA MAY NOT RAISE NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant's (Francia) Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant/Appellee's (Bally's) Motion to Dismiss filed with the
trial court consisted of six pages of argument of substantive
C \IN\BRIEF

3

law.

Record at 29.

The points he raised were 1) the exculpatory

clause was void as against public policy, and 2) alternative
theories of liability avoided dismissal of his claims.

He has

not raised the alternative theories point in this appeal.
Francia's public policy argument constituted three and onehalf pages of his memorandum in the trial court.
Pacific

Railroad

Co. ve

Record at 31-

34.

He cited Union

El Paso Natural

Gas

Co.,

408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965), which is discussed hereafter, for

the general proposition exculpatory clauses were always void in
Utah as against public policy.

He then cited other cases from

other jurisdictions for the propositions that; 1) inconspicuous
exculpatory language was not effective, and 2) general
exculpatory language was not effective.

No where within

Francia's memorandum was there mention of the contract being one
of adhesion.
In point one of his brief before this Court, Francia argues
his Membership Agreement with Bally's is void as a contract of
adhesion.

This point is supported by citations to 16 different

cases, none of which were cited to the trial court.

While

Francia alleges unequal bargaining power once in his memorandum
before the trial court, no where in that memorandum does he argue
the Membership Agreement is a contract of adhesion.

Superior

bargaining power is only one element of an adhesion contract.
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Wagner

v.

Farmers

Ins.

Exch.,

786 P.2d 763, 766 n.2 (Utah App.

1990) .
An argument will be deemed to have been raised before the
trial court if the trial court had an opportunity to enter
findings of fact and/or conclusions of law.
746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987).

James

v.

Preston,

There must be a "factual

showing or . . . submission of legal authority" before the
argument will be deemed to have been raised at the trial court
level, id.

Further, the trial court must address an argument

before it may be considered on appeal.
(U.S.A.)

Inc.

v.

11th

Ave.

Corp.,

Ong

International

850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah

1993) .
Even when this Court liberally construes Francia's
memorandum before the trial court, it cannot reach the conclusion
that he argued, before that court, that the Membership Agreement
was a contract of adhesion or that the six elements of Tunkl
Regents

of

Univ.

of

Calif.,

Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963) applied.

60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32
Because these issues are raised for

the first time on appeal, they may not be considered by this
Court.

C \IN\BRIEF
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II
FRANCIA FAILED TO RAISE ISSUES OF FACT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a party
to move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted."

Rule 12(b) provides:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
Bally's moved to dismiss Francia's Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) and attached the Affidavit of Sandra Harrington, an
employee of Bally's.

Record at 23.

Harrington's Affidavit

reported on its face that she was competent to testify to the
matters stated in the Affidavit, and that the document attached
to the Affidavit, Francia's Membership Application with Bally's,
was a true and correct copy of that document, and that Harrington
was a custodian of the membership record.

Under Rule 12(b), the

affidavit altered the nature of the motion to one which is
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
In response, Francia filed his Memorandum with five (5)
numbered paragraphs identified as "Statement of Facts".
at 29.

Record

These statements did not cite any supporting affidavit,

deposition, answers to interrogatories or admissions which would
C:\IN\BRIEF
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make them "facts."
memorandum.

No affidavit was filed with Francia's reply

There was no verification which would allow the

Memorandum to substitute for an affidavit.

The Memorandum itself

was not signed by Francia.
Rule 56 provides:
When a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and
supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits, or as
otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
Trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him. Rule 56(e),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; see also Watkiss
and
Campbell
v. Foa and Son, 808 P.2d 1061 Utah (1991).
Accordingly, the only "facts" which the trial court could
consider in addressing the motion were those contained in Sandra
Harrington's affidavit and the agreement attached to it.
Rule 56 is augmented by Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

Rule 4-501(1)(a) provides:

All motions, except uncontested or ex parte matters,
shall be accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, appropriate affidavits, and copies of or
citations by page number to relevant portions of
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion.
Despite the requirements of both Rule 56 and Rule 4-501,
Francia's Memorandum was not accompanied by affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, etc.

The use of

responsive affidavits is mandatory where the moving party has
presented affidavits or other facts which would require the
C:\IN\BRIEF
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granting of its motion.

Thayne

v.

Beneficial

Utah,

Inc.,

874

P.2d 120 (Utah 1994).
Thereafter, the court issued a Minute Entry granting
Bally's# Motion to Dismiss, Record at 68, and entered an order
elucidating the reasons therefor pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Record at 70.

Utah case law supports the interpretation of Rules 12 and
56, cited above, requiring the dismissal of Francia's appeal.
State

Bank

of

Southern

Utah v. Troy

Hygro

Systems,

In

8 94 P.2d 1270,

1277 (Utah App. 1995), the court addressed similar issues:
Despite asserting each of these defenses in its answer,
Hygro has not presented any evidence to support them.
'In resisting a Motion for Summary Judgment, bare
contentions, unsupported by any specifications of fact
in support thereof, raise no material questions of
fact.' First
Sec. Fin. vs. Okland Ltd.,
750 P.2d 195,
197 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Brigham
Trucking
Implement
Co. v. Fridle,
146 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah
1987) (per curium). As a party opposing the Bank's
properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment, Hygro
'had an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or
other materials allowed by Rule 56 (e) [of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure].' Thayne v. Beneficial
Utah,
Inc.,
847 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). Hygro simply did
not meet its burden by presenting some evidence, by
affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of
material fact with respect to any of these defenses.
Because Ballys filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion supported by
affidavits, that motion should have been treated and was treated
as a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment by the trial court.

As

a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, Francia was obligated to
provide affidavits or other supporting material appropriately
C:\IN\BRIEF
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delineated in Rule 56 to support his position with regards to the
motion.

Having failed to do so, the trial court was entitled to

and correctly did grant summary judgment.

Francia's failure to

file affidavits was fatal to his action below and is fatal to
appeal.

This defect alone requires that the appeal be dismissed.
Ill
THE EXCULPATORY CLAUSE IS NOT VOID

In opposing Bally's' Motion, Francia asserted the
exculpatory clause was "in much smaller print" and was not
bargained for by Francia.

Record at 30.

Even the most cursory

review of the contract shows that in actual fact, provisions of
Paragraph Ten were in exactly the same size type face as the
majority of the language on the front page of the agreement and
that the last two sentences in Paragraph Ten were printed in bold
type face and provide, "You acknowledge that you have carefully
read this waiver and release and fully understand that it is a
release of liability.

You are waiving any right to bring a legal

action to assert a claim for our negligence."

Not only was the

release language of Paragraph Ten not smaller than the rest of
the agreement, it was virtually the only information, not
required by Federal or State law, which was printed in bold.
Additionally, no affidavit was filed to show the terms were "not
bargained for".

C:\IN\BRIEF
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Francia's suggestion in his "Statement of Facts" that the
waiver and release provision was not bargained for was not
supported by anything he filed to support his position when
responding to the motion.
In addition to reading the provisions of Paragraph Ten as
suggest by Bally's, the trial court, in making its ruling, noted
additional language calling Francia's attention to the fact that
he was waiving certain rights under the contract.

Immediately

above Francia's signature on the front page of the agreement was
the following language.

Record at 68.

"WAIVER AND RELEASE:

This contract contains a WAIVER AND RELEASE in Paragraph 10 to
which you will be bound." [emphasis in the original]
Francia cited Union
Gas Co.,

Pacific

Railroad

Co.

v.

El Paso

Natural

408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965) for the proposition that

exculpatory clauses are void as against public policy.
not the holding of El Paso Natural

Gas.

El Paso Natural

That was
Gas is

in fact the case which governed the disposition of Bally's
motion, but required the dismissal of Francia's case.
Natural

Gas,

In El

Paso

this Court upheld the denial of the Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment based on exculpatory language which
would have required El Paso Natural Gas to indemnify Union
Pacific and hold it harmless:
. . . from and against any and all liability, loss,
damage, claims . . . of whatsoever nature . . . growing
out of injury or harm to, or death of persons
C:\IN\BRIEF

10

whomsoever, or loss or destruction of, or damage to
property whatsoever, including the pipe line, when such
injury, harm, death, loss, destruction or damage,
howsoever caused, grows out of, or arises from, the
bursting of or leaks in the pipeline, or in any other
way whatsoever is due to or arises because of the
existence of the pipeline where the construction,
operation, maintenance, repair, renewal,
reconstruction, or use of the pipeline or any part
thereof, or the contents therein or therefrom." Id. at
912 [emphasis in the original.]
In discussing exculpatory clauses in El Paso Natural

Gas,

this Court did not hold such clauses are void but only "the law
does not look with favor upon one exacting a covenant to relieve
himself of the basic duty which law imposes. . .", Id.

at 913.

While the law does not favor exculpatory clauses, there are
situations where they will be upheld.
This court described some of those situations.
The majority rule appears to be that in most situations,
where such is the desire of the parties, and it is clearly
understood and expressed, such a covenant will be upheld.
That the presumption is against such an intention, and it is
not achieved by inference or implication from general
language such as was employed here. It will be regarded as
a binding contractual obligation only when that intention is
clearly and unequivocally expressed.
If it had been the intent of the parties that the
Defendant should indemnify the Plaintiff even against
the latter's negligent acts, it would have been easy
enough to use that very language and to thus make that
intent clear and unmistakable which was not done here.
Id. at 914.
While that was not done in El Paso Natural
by Bally's.

C:\IN\BRIEF

Gas,

it was done

Paragraph Ten includes the following language:

11

This waiver and release of liability includes, without
limitation, injuries which may occur as a result of
(a) your use of any exercise equipment or facilities
which may malfunction or break, (b) our improper
maintenance of any exercise equipment or facilities,
(c) our negligent instruction or supervision, and
(d) you slipping and falling while in the Health Club
or on the premises.
Additionally, Francia's attention was specifically drawn to the
waiver and release language of Paragraph Ten by the bold type
immediately above his signature line on the first page of the
agreement.
The only factual allegations of Francia's Complaint
addressing any departure from a duty Bally's allegedly owed
Francia were that Bally's failed to properly train and/or
supervise the spotters who assisted in the weight lifting
contest.

The language of Paragraph Ten specifically addresses

and then waives and releases liability pertaining to negligent
To paraphrase El Paso Natural

training or supervision.

Gas,

"it

was easy enough to use that very language and to thus make that
intent clear. . ."

Id.

In El Paso Natural

at 914.
Gas,

this Court noted the Defendant had

to stretch the language of the release to reach the conclusion
that the injuries for which indemnification was sought were
covered by the agreement.

The court felt that "the fair import

of the entire provision . . .

is that the damage is guaranteed

against some causal connection with the construction, existence,

C \IN\BRIEF
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maintenance, or operation of the pipeline other than an incident
which happened merely coincidental with existence."

Id.

at 914.

In the current matter, the claims being waived and released by
Paragraph Ten were exactly the variety of claims Francia sought
to assert.
The clear reading of El Paso Natural

Gas is that while

exculpatory agreements may not be favored, they will be upheld if
appropriately drawn.

An appropriately drawn exculpatory

agreement, which relieves a party of liability for its own
negligence, must specify the negligent action or inactions for
which the party will not be liable.

The waiver and release

language of the Membership Agreement specified Bally's would not
be liable for failure to train or supervise.
sufficiently narrow to be enforced.

This language is

The agreement is not void

because it is too broad or too vague and is enforceable to
exclude the claims Francia asserted in before the trial court.
IV
TUNKL DOES NOT APPLY TO THE MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENT
Francia argues this Court should apply the law of Tunkl
Regents

of

Univ.

of

Cal.,

v.

60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32

Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963), in this matter.

The Tunkl

analysis was

created by the California Supreme Court to determine whether a
contract with a given entity is subject to stricter public policy
scrutiny because the entity is a public servant.
C:\IN\BRIEF
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The Tunkl

criteria, paraphrased from Francia's brief, are;

1) does the agreement concern an endeavor of a type generally
thought suitable for public regulation, 2) is the party seeking
exculpation performing a service of great importance to the
public, 3) is the party seeking exculpation willing to perform
its service of any member of the public who seeks it, 4) is there
a decisive economic advantage because of the essential nature of
the service, 5) is there no provision in the contract for
purchasing protection from negligence, and 6) the person seeking
the services must be placed under the control of the furnisher of
services.
Tunkl
Woodside

was cited by the Utah Court of Appeals in Russ
Homes,

Inc.,

905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1996).

In

the entity seeking to be exculpated was a home builder.

v.
Russ,
There

the Court of Appeals said:
In our view, it is clear that Woodside is not a
public servant. Traditionally, public servants are
state agencies, utilities, innkeepers, common carriers,
and public warehousers. See Tunkl v. Regents
of
Univ.
of Cal.,
60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 445 n.12, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (Cal. 1963). Public servants are those who
are duty bound to contract with all comers. While
Woodside does contract with some home buyers, it has no
obligation to contract with every home buyer. Public
servants are persons and entities that provide
essential and indispensable services such as hospital
care and police protection. See id. at 447 (discussing
essential nature of hospital services); Schrier
v.
Beltway
Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 533 A.2d 1316, 1323
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (contrasting alarm company's
services with essential nature of police services).
Woodside's service of building houses for private
C:\IN\BRIEF
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parties cannot be described as an essential public
service. Consequently, Woodside is not a public
servant.
A
NO FACTS SUPPORT TUNKL
A Tunkl

analysis would require the trial court to consider

facts and make findings of fact and reach conclusions of law.

To

perform this analysis, the court would need to hear testimony or,
in the case of a motion for summary judgment, have submitted to
it affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories.

Since no

such support was provided, no issue of fact allows the court to
make a Tunkl

analysis.

Even if the court were to decide a Tunkl

analysis could be

made as a matter of law, Bally's submits this Court could take
judicial notice of the fact that Bally's services would not meet
any element of the six conjunctive Tunkl

criteria.

B
TUNKL WAS NOT RAISED BELOW
Finally, this Court may not consider whether the Bally's
Membership Agreement meets the elements of the Tunkl
The Tunkl

analysis.

issue not raised before the trial court and may not be

considered for the first time on appeal for the reasons stated
above.
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CONCLUSION
Bally's Motion to Dismiss was treated as a Rule 56 Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Francia allowed the trial court to rely on

the language on the face of the Membership Agreement when he
failed to submit affidavits.

The trial court reviewed the

agreement and correctly ruled it specifically and narrowly
described the types of negligence for which Bally's would not be
held liable.

The Motion to Dismiss was appropriately granted.

Francia now asks this Court to examine the agreement under a
completely different analysis than that he presented to the trial
court.

Since these issues are raised for the first time on

appeal, the court may not consider them.
This court should dismiss Francia's appeal and grant Bally's
its costs.
DATED this

^
Q

day of April, 1996

Robert H.
Attorney for Appellee
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